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Abstract: 
This is a study of the effects of alternative investors on a range of work and employment 
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explore the reasons behind this variation, and the implications for theory and practice. 
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1. Introduction 
The implications of new financial actors for companies and employees is of growing concern 
in the field of management and employment relations, including interest from an international 
perspective (Gospel & Pendleton 2014). In a recent article published in this journal, 
Appelbaum et al. (2013) carried out four case studies for analysing the effect of private equity 
funding on work and employment relations. Their results suggest that these new financial 
actors “are not particularly embedded in, or constrained by, national business systems” 
(p.515).  
In this article, we focus on French companies where a financial firm (alternative investors, 
most commonly Private Equity [PE]) holds a majority stake, and accords particular attention 
to whether the firm is indigenous or not. There is a growing body of literature that suggests 
PE will have significant and far reaching effects on the work and employment practices of 
target organizations; and there is much controversy as to whether such buyouts prejudice 
employees (see, for example, Appelbaum & Batt 2014; Bacon et al. 2010; Bacon et al. 2012; 
Chambost et al. 2008; Clark 2013; Goergen et al. 2014).  However, much of the literature has 
tended to focus on the case of liberal market economies, on overall employment effects, and 
on indigenous private equity players. By comparing the effects of French and foreign PE 
investment in French companies on temporary employment, compensation and training 
expenses, this study seeks to contribute to the emerging literature on cross national PE 
investments, and the effect of PE on work and employment relations. It brings to bear new 
evidence from France, supplementing an emerging body of literature on private equity in 
continental Europe (c.f. Bacon et al. 2012; Boselie & Koene 2010). 
The Varieties of Capitalism literature (Hall & Soskice 2001; Lane & Wood 2012) argues that, 
in general, the Liberal Market Economies (LMEs) are associated with a primary emphasis on 
Country of Origin and Private Equity 
 3
shareholder value. In LMEs job protection is lower and unions weaker.  In more Coordinated 
Markets (CMEs), this is mediated through stronger stakeholder rights. France has been 
categorized in numerous different ways, from a coordinated market economy (CME), through 
a CME that is liberalizing, to state directed capitalism (Hall & Soskice 2001; Schmidt 2000). 
A recent study by Witt et al. (2017) reveals that, in terms of a range of regulator and macro-
economic features, France is closer to the Mediterranean and East European EU member 
states than either an LME or a CME; such economies are characterized by weaker 
institutional coupling and more room for innovation. Nevertheless, a feature of the country is 
that employment protection and union rights are relatively strong. The case of France is of 
particular interest given the history of the higher levels of coordination than encountered in 
Liberal Market Economies (LMEs), a distinct body of corporate law, and the widespread 
assumption that the French model is in flux (Culpepper 2005) and, hence, particularly 
vulnerable to pressures from abroad. France is also the second largest investment market for 
private equity in Europe1. 
Although there is an extensive literature on country of origin and domicile effects in the case 
of firms crossing national boundaries, it has tended to focus on differences between the 
contextual circumstances of firm headquarters versus the country of domicile, rather than the 
country of origin of investors (Brewster et al. 2008; Edwards et al, 2007; Edwards & 
Kuruvilla, 2005), and the relative strength of ties between the investor and local actors 
(Jackson & Deeg 2008).  However, overseas investors may play an important role in initiating 
and accelerating systemic change (Dore 2008).  In addition to country of origin effects, local 
players are likely to have denser ties to other local actors, which may encourage them to stick 
to tried and tested national recipes (Jackson & Deeg 2008; Morgan 2012). Earlier work by 
Guery et al. (2017) indicated that PE investment from overseas was likely to lead to job cuts, 
in contrast with French PE investments; we supplement and extend this analysis to cover a 
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wider range of work and employment practices. It is argued that PE investment is 
characterized by high levels of debt leverage (Cumming et al. 2007), whereas venture capital 
investment focuses on early stage companies which typically lack the assets enabling the 
same degree of debt leverage, and they are excluded from the main part of our study (c.f. 
Bottazzi & Da Rin  (2002). However, as an additional robustness check, we also included 
such firms in our analysis, in order to confirm the distinct consequences of private equity.  
This study focuses on mature firms, as this has been the scene of the most controversy. The 
analyses are based on a sample of 964 mature workplaces belonging to the 2010-2011 
REPONSE dataset.  We accord particular attention to the use of temporary employment, to 
training expenditures, and to the use of restriction, freezing or decrease of compensation 
levels, all indicators of the relative interdependence of employers and employees (Brewster et 
al. 2008; Whitley 1999).    
2. Private Equity, Work and Employment 
There is a growing body of research on the consequences of private equity takeovers on firm 
performance and employment.  Cushen & Thompson (2016) note that alternative investors 
represent an important vehicle for introducing financialization into non-financial corporations.  
It has been argued that a PE takeover will result in more effective management, so that even if 
there are short-term job cuts, employees can look forward with greater confidence to the long 
term (Wilson et al. 2012). Looking at evidence from 3200 target firms, Davis et al. (2014) 
found that modest initial job losses were followed by a tendency to more radical upsizing and 
downsizing than that encountered in the period leading up to the takeover.  Wilson et al. 
(2012) argued that both prior to and after the onset of the financial crisis that began in 2008, 
PE owned firms outperformed firms not subject to a takeover in terms of job creation 
potential. Wright et al. (2009) conclude that the bulk of research evidence suggests that in the 
long-term initial job losses following PE takeovers were compensated for by later hirings 
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once necessary adjustments had been performed. Harris et al. (2005) found that MBOs are 
associated with a shift to less labour intensive production, outsourcing, and the shift of 
resources towards the most productive areas of activity.  Wright et al. (2000) argue that PE 
takeovers accord managers more room to adopt ‘entrepreneurial mindsets’, which could 
include forging new accommodations with employees and introducing policies aimed 
enhancing commitment. 
However, a large component of the mainstream employment relations literature is much more 
sceptical.  It has been suggested that PE takeovers rashly liquidate accumulated assets, 
discount the value of the capabilities of existing staff, saddle the firm with excess debt, lead to 
large scale job losses, and endanger the firm’s continued existence  (see, for example, 
Appelbaum et al. 2013; Clark 2013).  Clark (2009a) argues that PE is fundamentally 
disruptive to established employment relations through, inter alia, eroding the principle of 
managerial discretion.  Based on four redistribution-level case studies in the UK, Appelbaum 
et al. (2013) found that PE takeovers were associated with breaches of trust and breaches of 
implicit contracts: in other words, they eroded the basis of employer-employee 
interdependence.  Contrary to what is held by agency theory, they argue that PE takeovers are 
not ‘welfare neutral’, with a more radical approach to shareholder value that further erodes 
the position of other stakeholders (e.g. Heyes et al. 2012). This means that PE may not only 
undermine the interdependence of employees and the firm, but also change the extent of 
delegation to employees (Clark 2007; 2009b).  Rather than following a defined template, PE 
is associated with open-ended transformation of both relations with managers and 
employment relations generally (Clark 2013). Goergen et al. (2014) found that those investors 
were associated with greater job shedding, reduced productivity and poorer overall 
organizational performance.  
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Most of the existing work on PE does not look at country of origin effects, and assumes that 
PE will have similar effects irrespective of national context (Appelbaum et al. 2013).   Indeed, 
Bacon et al. (2012) found that rather than national origin, a key determinant of PE effects on 
HRM was envisaged investment time scale: longer term investment horizons being associated 
with a greater propensity to introduce HPWPs. Other work on country of origin effects and 
PE primarily concentrates on financial and strategic, rather than work and employment issues 
(Bruining & Wright 2002; Engel & Stiebale 2014; Meuleman & Wright 2011).  Bedu & 
Montalban (2013) found that countries with low levels of employment protection were 
particularly attractive to LBO orientated PE, suggesting that the business model depended on 
the ability to readily shed labour. .However, in France, recent work indicates that the effects 
of PE on overall employment were different between French and overseas PE: the effects of 
French PE on employment were no different to any other French investor, whilst job losses 
were greater in the case of foreign PE ([Authors 2017]).  We add to this work through 
exploring the effects of private equity on the relative propensity to make use of temporary 
labour, to restrict, freeze or decrease compensation levels, and to invest in training.  
3. Institutions, Country of Origin and Domicile 
As the literature on comparative capitalisms (Jackson & Deeg 2008; Thelen 2014) alerts us, 
whilst there are dominant forces in the global capitalist ecosystem, these continue to be 
mediated or reformed through embedded institutional arrangements at regional, national, and 
supra-national levels (Jessop 2012); firms will tailor their strategy and practices to reap the 
advantages of local complementarities (e.g. the Varieties of Capitalism approach of Hall & 
Soskice 2001; Hancke et al. 2007). More recently, it has been argued that firms (or, indeed, 
investors) that cross national boundaries are at best only partially embedded within individual 
institutional regimes: Firms will seek to reconcile the benefits of fitting in with local 
production regimes with the need for internal organizational coherence and the desire to gain 
Country of Origin and Private Equity 
 7
the maximum benefits from potential global mobility (Morgan 2012).  Whilst the French 
national context, for example, has many features that are distinct from other institutional 
regimes, it has been argued that market arrangements are mediated and coordinated through 
state interventions (Hall & Soskice 2001; Hancke et al. 2007).  Hence, foreign investors may 
have to temper their agendas when entering France, in line with national corporate law and/ or 
in order to be able to gain some of the specific benefits that accrue from the local regulatory 
environment.   
4. Private Equity,  Work and Employment practices, and country of origin effects: 
hypotheses 
Divergences in PE industries 
The French PE industry is different from Anglo-Saxon PE industries, and these divergences 
might suggest that their influences on the management of the companies funded by PE are 
different (Bruton et al., 2010). For example, in the UK and in the USA, PE and venture capital 
firms as a rule are independent institutions, and their main sources of finance include pension 
funds, insurance companies and other institutional investors (Kaplan et al., 2007). Such PE 
firms exist of course in France, but others tend to be subsidiaries of banks and other financial 
institutions (so-called captives) (Mayer et al., 2005). Others are also linked to governmental 
agencies. These approaches are less common in France than the European average (around 
13.5% of the total fundraising vs. 38%, EVCA 2014), but significant compared to the UK 
private equity industry for example, where such fundraising is almost non-existent (1.6% of 
the total fundraising, EVCA 2014). These investors’ objectives could be broader than just 
finance. Bpifrance, the main public investment group with the French state as shareholder, 
introduces itself as a socially responsible investor in its doctrine of intervention (Bpifrance, 
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2013), taking into account the impact of funded companies on their stakeholders, including in 
terms of territorial employment and development.  
Syndication is also a point of divergence. Some case studies, focused on venture capital 
(Dubocage & Galindo, 2008), or encompassing venture capital and PE (Stevenot, 2007), 
underline the importance of syndication in the French context. As French PE partnerships are 
generally smaller than American or British ones, PE investments frequently require a 
syndicate of investors. Consequently, the same pool of investors in PE  frequently participate 
in deals involving eachother. The consequence is reputational effects. PE firms aspire to be 
active long-term players in the industry, which depends on their reputational capital, a 
precious resource in the competitive PE industry which is beset by considerable information 
asymmetries between PEs and their investors, as well as between PE firms and backed 
companies (Nahata, 2010). A good reputation is therefore critical for PE firms because it 
helps in developing useful working relationships with entrepreneurs, lawyers, investment 
bankers, auditors, and others who provide useful services to portfolio companies (Sahlman 
1990). A good reputation is also critical in the relationship between PE firms and in the 
capacity for a PE of being part of further syndications, Wright and Lockett (2003) showing 
that non-legal sanctions in syndications, such as reputational damage, are important for 
ensuring cooperation. Given that a majority of PE deals in France involve the formation of PE 
syndicates, one can suppose that reputational effects in the PE industry are very strong. 
Furthermore, and maybe due to syndication, the venture capital and PE monitoring of 
investments is weaker in France than in countries like the UK (Sapienza et al., 1996). For all 
these reasons, French PE is probably less likely to creature pressure for reducing costs and 
increasing labour flexibility as part of value extraction.  
Private Equity and Temporary Employment 
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For employers, particularly in countries where employment law is extensive, temporary 
employment provides a way of mitigating the effects of job protection legislation and opens 
up the possibility of adjusting numbers rapidly to meet changing demand. For employees, by 
contrast, this kind of temporary employment is very much a ‘second-best’ form of 
employment with its built-in precariousness. Short-term and temporary employment has 
become increasingly prevalent in France, and fixed term work may constitute up to 80% of 
new hires (OECD 2014).  However, as with any change in dominant forms of practice, the use 
of temporary work may be accelerated by ‘norm entrepreneurs’ (Dore 2008), who may not 
only seek to increase the portion of temporary labour through the natural ebb and flow of 
people, but take more aggressive measures to alter the existing composition of the workforce, 
testing the limits of regulation. It may be that pressure from PE investors from LMEs to 
facilitate anticipated downsizing will lead to firms increasing the proportion of temporary and 
fixed term employment more rapidly than their French counterparts. This provides a more 
nuanced contextualisation for the first hypothesis.  Hence,  
H1i: The presence of temporary workers is significantly higher in foreign PE backed 
firms than in French firms with no PE involvement. 
H1ii: The presence of temporary workers in French PE backed firms is 
indistinguishable from French firms with no PE involvement.   
Compensation  
Apart from moving towards short-term contracts, two other ways that firms can reduce their 
interdependence with their people is by holding salaries down and cutting staff development 
and training.  There is a body of existing research that suggests that PE is likely to lead to, at 
least, constraints on compensation levels and perhaps even to cuts in wages (Appelbaum & 
Batt 2014; Goergen et al. 2014). Organizational factors (Balkin & Gomez-Mejia 1987) and 
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environmental factors (Milkovitch & Newman 2008) influence compensation, not only the 
level of salaries but also the compensation structure. Werner et al. (2005) show the impact of 
ownership structure on the pay of all employees.  The use of bonuses is a widespread 
mechanism for maximising shareholder value, in order to make for greater wage flexibilitiy 
(Jackson et al. 2005; Conway et al. 2008); it shifts a greater proportion of the risks onto the 
employee (Lazonick & Mazzzucato 2013).  However, if the foreign PE investors are 
particularly concerned with short term value release, they may press for immediate pay cuts, 
even if they combine them with measures to introduce greater insecurity into reward systems. 
Hence, 
H2i:  Restriction, freezing or decrease of compensation levels is more common in 
foreign PE backed firms than in French firms with no PE involvement. 
H2ii: Restriction, freezing or decrease of compensation levels in French PE backed 
firms is indistinguishable from French firms with no PE involvement. 
Training  
Turning to staff development, any kind of training requires the investment of time and 
resources, including financial resources. Training is the exemplar HRM activity for defining 
whether a firm is adopting a policy of value enhancement, which would involve improving 
workforce capabilities (Guery & Pendleton 2016), or short-termist redistribution, which 
would involve cutting training costs (Goergen et al. 2012). France is one of the countries 
where firm involvement in vocational education and training tends to be high. Until recently 
French law required firms with more than 20 employees to invest at least 1.6% of the total 
payroll in employee training. LME firms generally have much less involvement in staff 
development (Busemeyer & Trampusch 2012; Goergen et al. 2012). Even if the level of 
spending on training is quite high in French firms whoever the shareholders, we can expect 
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that foreign private equity investors tend to reduce training costs to come closer to the LME’s 
training practices and to improve short-termist finances.  On the contrary, we do not expect 
French PE investors to cut training expenses because they are more embedded in the 
institutional setting. Therefore we anticipate that: 
H3i: Reduction in spending on training is more common in foreign PE backed firms 
than in French firms with no PE involvement. 
H3ii: Reduction in spending on training in levels in French PE backed firms is 
indistinguishable from French firms with no PE involvement. 
5. Methodology 
Data and Variables Definitions 
These theoretical hypotheses are tested using the French 2010-2011 REPONSE survey, 
conducted by DARES (the research department of the Ministère du travail, de l’emploi, de la 
formation professionnelle et du dialogue social or Ministry of Labour). This is a nationally 
representative establishment-level survey. The initial sample includes 4,000 establishments 
with 11 employees or more, excluding the agricultural sector. We excluded public 
administration, educational social and health sector, the financial sector, companies whose 
employees are the main shareholders (as in workers’ co-operatives) and listed companies, in 
order to ensure coverage of establishments that could be funded by private equity to develop 
their activity (Wood & Wright 2010). In order to be sure that the establishments in our sample 
are potentially involved with private equity funding but not venture capital funding, we 
excluded organizations less than five years old and those with less than 50 employees. 
Finally, we did not keep establishments that belong to foreign companies, because foreign 
headquarters can influence work and employment practices in their subsidiaries (Almond 
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2011). This database allows us to compare foreign and French PE backed firms with a control 
group of companies whose work and employment practices are not influenced by foreign 
headquarters. This gave us a resultant sample of 964 establishments. 
The REPONSE survey asks whether majority ownership is held by a financial company 
(alternative investor). The alternative investor ecosystem encompasses private equity, venture 
capital, Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs), and hedge funds. Hedge funds invest in a very wide 
range of asset classes; in seeking high returns, they rarely seek a majority shareholding or 
outright control of a company, but rather take advantages of short term movements in share 
prices (Coffee & Palia, 2016).  Activist hedge funds seek a change in managerial direction, 
but their influence on quotidian managerial practice is indirect and again, typically as a 
minority shareholder in listed firms (Coffee & Palia, 2016).  Sovereign Wealth Funds are 
intended to represent an intergenerational governmental savings device for forex windfalls; 
here the existing literature suggests their impact on work and employment will be limited 
(Gospel et al. 2014) or, in the case of the Norwegian one, which has an explicitly ethical brief, 
positive (Wood et al. 2017).   Again, in most instances, SWFs hold only a very small minority 
of shares (Wood et al. 2017).  An exception is France, which has its own SWF type fund, the 
Strategic Investment Fund, whose focus is on co-investment in strategically important firms, 
(rather than assuming overall control as PE typically does), albeit that, in comparative terms, 
it represents quite a small player (Todd 2011).  Private equity is different to the previous types 
of alternative investor in that they normally take a majority shareholding and then delist the 
company (and, hence, constitutes the overwhelming majority of unlisted firms with financial 
company majority ownership encompassed by REPONSE), and seeks to release value through 
explicitly imparting a fresh direction in managerial behaviour (Goergen et al. 2014).  Again, a 
focus on unlisted firms eliminates those that are subject to cross shareholding by banks that 
also provide loans, which is traditionally identified as a feature of CMEs (Hardie et al. 2013). 
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Hence, in this article, for analytical ease, we refer to PE, but recognise that our sample could 
potentially encompass the relative small number of instances where another type of 
alternative investor assumes overall control.  Venture capital - which invests in early stage 
companies - is excluded from this study (we exclude small and young firms, apart from as a 
robustness check)2.  
The REPONSE survey is mainly concerned with industrial relations and human resource 
management practices, but it is also, to our knowledge, one of the very few databases that 
includes information on the ownership status of French companies, both listed and non-listed. 
A question asked to one top manager per establishment allows us to know whether ownership 
is private equity or other shareholders like family, a non-financial company or others. Another 
question relates to the nationality of the shareholder: French or foreign. In our sample, 9.23% 
of the establishments belong to companies funded by French PE and 8.30% to companies 
funded by foreign PE. This variable does not allow us to know the country of origin of foreign 
PE. However, analysing data included in CFNEWS database about private equity acquisitions 
of French companies in 2010 reveals that more than 85% of the foreign investments come 
from LMEs (mainly the UK and the USA). We can therefore be confident that ‘foreign PE’ in 
the REPONSE survey mainly refers to LME PE firms. Although foreign PEs seem to invest in 
larger and older targets than French PEs (see Table 1), the results of difference in means tests 
between the characteristics of firms funded by French PE and firms funded by foreign PE 
give a more nuanced picture. Indeed, some differences exist between these two groups, but 
they are infrequently statistically significant (except mainly for industry). We can therefore be 
confident that French PE and foreign PE are present in similar kinds of establishments, even if 
differences in industry could perhaps explain some differences in our outcomes. 
A first important variable for our study in order to test H1 is a proxy for contingent 
employment, that is to say the presence of temporary workers (see Table 2 for descriptive 
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statistics of the main variables, and differences between non-funded establishments, 
establishments funded by French PE, and establishments funded by foreign PE). A dummy 
representing the use of restriction, freezing or decrease of compensation to assist the firm 
during economic crisis is used for testing H2. For testing H3, we focus on the changes in 
training expenses during the last three years. More precisely, the variable is the presence of a 
decrease of the training expenses level, relatively to the total payroll. 
As management practices of PE backed firms may be affected by some characteristics of the 
parent firm (size, multi-unit or not) and of the establishment (age, industry, composition of 
the workforce), all these factors are controlled by dummy variables (see, for example, Davis 
et al. 2011). Employment management, training expenses, as well as compensation policies 
may be influenced by the presence of a trade union (Bennett and Kaufman 2007). We control 
therefore for trade union presence in the establishment. Four positions are used for industries 
(industrial sector; wholesale and retail trade; services; others), six for the parent firm size (50-
99 employees; 100-199; 200-499; 500-999; 1000-4999; 5000 and more), and four for the age 
of the workplace (5-9 years; 10-19; 20-49; 50 and more). ‘Mono-unit’ and ‘union 
representative in the workplace’ are dummies. The ‘skills ratio’ is also a dummy, with 1 when 
managers and engineers are the main category of employees, 0 if others. Descriptive statistics 
for all these variables, for the whole sample and across the different categories of ownership 
can be found in Table 1. Tetrachoric correlations were computed for all the variables used in 
our analysis and no significant problems have emerged. 
Propensity Score Matching Method 
In order to analyse the impact of foreign and French Private Equity investment on work and 
employment relations in French firms, we estimate a ‘causal treatment effect’ (Rubin 1974) of 
private equity on contingent employment, compensation and training, differentiating between 
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French PE and foreign PE3. We use a matching method, initially used in medical studies, for 
assessing the causal effect of a treatment (here, being funded by French PE, or by foreign PE) 
on the work and employment practices we are concerned with. This method consists of 
matching a treated entity with a non-treated entity with similar characteristics, in order to 
compute the average effect of the treatment on the treated. It is easy to find similar entities 
taking into account two or three characteristics, but much more difficult with more 
characteristics. Rosenbaum & Rubin (1983) proposed therefore not to use the characteristics 
themselves for matching entities, but a propensity score, that is to say the probability for an 
entity to receive the treatment regarding their characteristics. In this article, we test the effect 
of two ‘treatments’ (i.e. French PE funding and foreign PE funding). Two probit models are 
therefore used to estimate: 1) the propensity score of being funded by French PE; 2) the 
propensity score of being funded by foreign PE. This includes, as the dependent variable the 
dummy for private equity ownership, and as explanatory variables, the characteristics of the 
establishment and of the parent firm noted above. 
As propensity score matching enables us to adjust the selection bias (i.e. on average, 
companies funded by PE do not have the same characteristics as non-funded companies), we 
can compare work and employment practices between establishments that are as similar as 
possible, except for the fact than one establishment (treatment group) is part of a company 
funded by French private equity and the other is neither funded by PE nor belongs to a foreign 
company (control group). The same procedure is then replicated for establishments that are 
part of a company funded by foreign PE. Propensity score matching has become a popular 
approach to estimate causal treatment effects in non-experimental causal studies (Caliendo & 
Kopeinig 2008). It is used for example when evaluating labour market policies (Heckman et 
al. 1997) or the effect of unionisation on wages (Eren 2007). 
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Several methods can be used for matching the establishments of the treated group to similar 
establishments in the control group. There is no clear evidence about how to choose the 
matching method and it is therefore sensible to use a number of approaches, even if some 
authors consider that kernel matching is the more reliable (Frölich 2007). We use therefore a 
number of them as a robustness check: the classical nearest-neighbour matching and two 
kernel matching functions (Gaussian kernel and Epanechnikov kernel)4. With growing sample 
size, these methods should become closer to comparing exact matches (Caliendo & Kopeinig 
2008). 
The last step of the methodology consists in comparing the matched establishments with 
respect to their objectives, their training practices, employment practices and compensation 
practices, in order to analyse the hypothesized effects of private equity. The ATT (average 
treatment effect on the treated) is then computed by averaging for each outcome the 
differences between matched establishments. Bootstrapping (Lechner 2002) is used for testing 
the statistical significance of effects for kernel matching (Caliendo & Kopeinig 2008), and the 
Abadie & Imbens (2004, 2008) method for nearest-neighbour matching. 
This procedure is firstly used to estimate the effect of French private equity on the presence of 
temporary workers, then the effect on compensation practices (individual bonuses, collective 
bonuses, profit sharing, employee share ownership, and restriction, freezing or decrease of 
compensation as an approach to facing the economic crises), and the decrease of training 
expenses. It is afterwards replicated for foreign private equity. 
6. Findings 
Descriptives  
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Table 2 describes difference in means tests for French PE funded versus non-funded 
establishments, then for those funded by foreign PE versus non-funded establishments. In 
other words, it enables us firstly to compare non-funded to funded establishments, then to see 
if there are differences between French-funded and foreign-funded establishments. 
There are clear and significant differences in training expenses, temporary employment, 
compensation practices and restrictions between establishments funded by foreign PE and 
non-funded establishments, whereas the differences between establishments funded by French 
PE and non-funded establishments are very weak and not significant.  The presence of 
temporary workers and the decrease of training expenses are even slightly less common in 
French PE backed establishments (respectively 43.8% and 5.7%) than in non-funded 
establishments (44.6% and 7.3%). Differences are much more significant with foreign PE 
funded establishments. In these establishments, there is a stronger pressure to favour the 
presence of temporary workers (61.2%), to decrease training expenses (19.2%), and to use 
restriction, freezing or decrease of compensation as a means of facing economic crises (70% 
versus 50.3% for non-funded establishments).  
Causal treatment effect of French and foreign private equity (propensity score matching) 
The results of propensity score matching clearly highlight the influence of foreign PE on 
temporary employment, compensation and training expenses. Our first hypotheses (H1i and 
H1ii) are confirmed: Whereas French PE investors do not have any influence on insecure 
labour, foreign PE favours the use of temporary contracts. All the three matching algorithms 
clearly lead to convergent significant results at the 5% level (Table 3). 
Our second hypotheses (H2i and H2ii) dealt with compensation practices. The results of PSM 
methods are again clear-cut (Table 4). Establishments funded by French PE investors did not 
use ‘restriction, freezing or decrease of compensation’ during economic crisis more than non-
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funded establishments. By contrast, foreign PE firms favour their use, reflecting a desire to 
control or reduce the total payroll. This result is significant at the level of 1% according to the 
nearest-neighbour matching method and the two kernel matching methods (Gaussian and 
Epanechnikov).  
Our last hypotheses (H3i and H3ii) are that French PE firms are much less likely to reduce 
spending on training than foreign PE firms. Our results (Table 5) show that French PE funded 
establishments are not more likely to reduce training expenses than establishments not-funded 
by PE, whilst foreign PE investment is related to a decrease on spending on training and 
development. The three PSM methods are convergent with significant results at the level of 
5% for the two kernel matching methods, at 10% with the nearest-neighbour matching 
method. H3i and H3ii are supported by our results. 
7. Discussion and conclusions 
Our findings provide strong evidence for the country of origin effects in private equity 
investment. We found that constraints on contingent employment, compensation levels and 
training expenses differed based on PE investors’ country of origin.  This suggests there is not 
a single model of private equity.  Even if there are dominant trends in the global capitalist 
ecosystem, new financial actors continue to face varying constraints according to national 
contexts and their relative embeddedness.   
Foreign PE investors were associated with reduced training expenses, employment and 
constraints on pay. This supplements the findings of Appelbaum, Clark and others (Clark 
2009; Appelbaum et al. 2013), who argue that PE results in the breach of contracts.  However, 
our study reveals that it is PE country of origin that influences the strategy imposed on the 
target firm, rather than PE per se.  French PE investors seem more inclined to ‘let managers 
get on with their job’ and/ or support an established national recipe. Explanations of these 
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differences may be that either PE behaviour reflects country of origin effects and/or that 
indigenous players have denser and thicker ties to other local actors and, hence, are more 
inclined to concur with local norms, and, as noted above, temper excessively short-termist 
behaviour (c.f. Jackson & Deeg, 2008; Morgan, 2012). Indeed, given that French PE 
partnerships are generally smaller than American or British ones, syndication is wider used. 
Consequently, the same pools of French investors in PE frequently participate in deals 
involving each other.  Evangelizing hardline approaches to organized labour and promoting 
job cuts may play well with some international investors, but are likely to alienate French PE 
actors with strong ties to the state.  Again, many French investors are committed to good 
relations with stakeholders; even those that do not will have to take this seriously if they are 
not to be shunned by potential syndicate partners. They are therefore implicitly encouraged to 
avoid hardline approaches of human resource management, which could generate negative 
effects in terms of poor industrial relations that might  make managers’ work more difficult 
and jeopardise the public image of the firm. Those with a poor or diminishing reputation will 
battle to engage in future syndication (Wright and Lockett 2003; Sahlman 1990). However, 
this would discount the effects of agency: as Simmel (1980) notes, the choices made by actors 
reflect both objective choices and subjective reinterpretations thereof (Lane & Wood 2012).  
Socio-economic conditions may make it harder to adopt very short termist HRM policies in 
France, but our research indicates that for determined foreign owners it is not impossible.    
Hence, an important question for future research would be whether French PE investors 
would behave the same way when they invest outside of France. Our findings reveal that 
foreign (mostly LME) PE is more likely to drive more hard-line approaches to managing 
people in the businesses it invests in, but indigenous PE is less likely to do so.  This 
underscores the relationship between broader political economy, and the relative 
embeddedness of different players in the PE ecosystem therein. Corporate governance reflects 
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a wide range of contextual dynamics, and clearly there is need for further qualitative and 
micro-level work on why indigenous PE would be less likely to be concerned with short term 
value release and breaching psychological contracts with employees than their foreign 
counterparts.   
Our research does have limitations, mainly those created by the use of the particular data 
source. Whilst this gives us confidence that our survey is representative and reflects an 
accurate picture of all but the smallest French businesses, it would have been interesting to 
have more data on the financial history and situation of each firm. We have compared our 
discussion with the literature and drawn much of our analysis from the Anglo-Saxon PE 
industry while the data is from ‘foreign’ firms per se, albeit in an industry that originated in, 
and remains dominated by players from LMEs.  Whilst the vast majority of the foreign PE in 
France is from LME countries, it would have been preferable to have been able to separate 
out the small number of non-LME investors.   
Propensity score matching enables us to compute ‘causal treatment effect’ based on cross-
sectional data. However a limitation of this method is that additional observable or 
unobservable characteristics could differ between the ‘treated’ observations and their 
counterparts in the control group. As a consequence, it is still difficult to establish causality 
links using cross-sectional data. The use of panel data in future researches might overcome 
this limitation. 
It would also be valuable to compare the effects of changes in work and employment relations 
policies on long-term organisational performance; in other words, does a shift to more hard-
line HRM policies leave the firm better or worse off in the longer term? Finally, it is 
recognized, as with the alternative investor community at large, PE is, in itself, a diverse 
ecosystem. A key distinction here is between Institutional Buyouts (IBOs, where the PE buyer 
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replaces the managerial team and strategy), Managerial Buy Ins (MBIs, where a prospective 
new managerial team arranges outside PE funding to make a takeover possible, and MBOs 
(where the existing managerial team secures PE funding to take over the firm) (Wood & 
Wright 2010).  Existing work would suggest that IBOs and MBIs have significantly worse 
consequences for employees than MBOs (ibid.; Goergen et al. 2014); a more detailed study 
comparing these different manifestations of PE in France would provide further insights into 
country of domicile effects and the relative pull of different institutional domains. 
Nevertheless, the results are unequivocal. French private equity investors tend to follow the 
national recipe and maintain employment, pay and conditions and employee training and 
development broadly in line with other French companies, presumably with the aim of 
developing the assets and making money from long-term growth and expansion. This may 
partially be explained by the degree of state support for private equity when it serves national 
or regional developmental objectives (c.f. Gaspar 2012).  In contrast foreign PE investors are 
associated with the use of more contingent policies, with lower levels of investment in people, 
presumably with the aim of extracting as much short-term value as possible.    
This leaves us with outstanding questions, and an outstanding research agenda: is the 
influence of indigenous PE similarly comparatively benign in other CMEs? Is French PE 
similarly benign when it is exported to other countries? Is the influence of LME PE similarly 
negative in other countries? The answers to these questions remain for further empirical 
research but may well have significant implications for the investment strategies of 
governments, particularly in developing nations.   At a theoretical level, this would indicate 
that investor country of origin may have just as strong effects as where a firm is 
headquartered and/ or confirm that indigenous players are more likely to fit in with national 
recipes owing to their denser ties with local players.  This confirms the relevance of socio-
economic approaches to comparative institutional analysis, which place the relative 
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embeddedness of players within specific national contexts at the heart of their analysis (Hall 
& Soskice, 2001; Jackson & Deeg, 2008).  It also confirms the distinct nature of French 
capitalism, and that even if delisting may open opportunities to alter work and employment 
practices, local players continue to opt for the dominant national recipe (even if the latter may 
itself be in a process of broader change).  
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APPENDIX 
 
 
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of establishments characteristics 
 
 
 Global 
sample 
Freq. 
Non 
funded 
establishm
ents 
Freq. 
French PE 
backed 
establish
ments 
Freq. 
Foreign 
PE backed 
establishm
ents 
Freq. 
Difference 
in means 
between 
French 
and 
foreign PE 
backed 
establishm
ents (t-
stat) 
Industry      
    Industrial sector 0.321 0.324 0.202 0.425 -3.208*** 
   Wholesale and retail 
trade 
0.390 0.405 0.382 0.250 2.689*** 
   Services 0.221 0.198 0.348 0.312 0.491 
   Others  0.068 0.073 0.068 0.013 -2.309** 
Parent firm size      
   50 - 99 employees 0.197 0.221 0.114 0.051 1.465 
   100 - 199 employees 0.197 0.214 0.126 0.115 0.215 
   200 - 499 employees 0.196 0.192 0.218 0.217 0.006 
   500 - 999 employees 0.141 0.138 0.149 0.153 -0.078 
   1000 - 4999 
employees 
0.151 0.127 0.264 0.269 -0.070 
   5000 and more 0.114 0.105 0.126 0.192 -1.157 
Age of the establishment      
   5 to 9 years 0.094 0.089 0.147 0.088 1.172 
   10 to 19 years 0.213 0.197 0.340 0.227 1.614 
   20 to 49 0.437 0.444 0.363 0.443 -1.042 
   50 and more 0.254 0.268 0.147 0.240 -1.522 
Mono-unit 0.370 0.384 0.370 0.225 2.075** 
Skills ratio 0.081 0.062 0.213 0.125 1.524 
Union representative in 
the establishment 
0.579 0.553 0.651 0.762 -1.578 
* if p < 0.10; ** if p < 0.05; *** if p < 0.01 
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Table 2. Univariate difference in means tests 
 
  Difference in Means 
Tests between non 
funded establishments 
and establishments 
funded by French PE 
Difference in Means 
Tests between non 
funded establishments 
and establishments 
funded by foreign PE 
 
 
 
Non 
funded 
Funded by 
French PE 
t-stat : 
equal 
means 
Funded by 
foreign PE 
t-stat : 
equal 
means 
Presence of temporary 
workers 
0.446 0.438 0.157 0.612 -2.839*** 
Restriction, freezing or 
decrease of 
compensation during 
the last 3 years 
0.503 0.511 -0.146 0.700 -3.777*** 
Decrease of training 
expenses 
0.073 0.057 0.535 0.192 -3.644*** 
* if p < 0.10; ** if p < 0.05; *** if p < 0.01 
 
 
 
 
Table 3. Propensity score matching – effect of French PE and foreign PE on contingent 
employment 
 
 Effect of French PE Effect of foreign PE 
 Effect SE OS Effect SE OS 
Presence of temporary workers       
   Nearest-neighbour matching -0.113 0.072 1 0.166** 0.065 0 
   Kernel matching (normal/Gaussian) 0.011 0.053 1 0.145** 0.059 0 
   Kernel matching (Epanechnikov) 0.020 0.057 1 0.134** 0.058 0 
* if p < 0.10; ** if p < 0.05; *** if p < 0.01 
Notes: Standard errors for kernel matching algorithms (normal/Gaussian and Epanechnikov) 
are based on 200 bootstrap replications. Standard errors for nearest-neighbour algorithms are 
based on the method proposed by Abadie and al. (2004).  
OS (off support) indicates the number of treated individuals discarded because of missing 
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Table 4. Propensity score matching – effect of French PE and foreign PE on 
compensation 
 
 Effect of French PE Effect of foreign PE 
 Effect SE OS Effect SE OS 
Restriction, freezing or decrease of 
compensation during the last 3 years 
      
   Nearest-neighbour matching -0.079 0.082 1 0.225*** 0.065 0 
   Kernel matching (normal/Gaussian) -0.034 0.070 1 0.193*** 0.057 0 
   Kernel matching (Epanechnikov) -0.051 0.066 1 0.179*** 0.058 0 
* if p < 0.10; ** if p < 0.05; *** if p < 0.01 
Notes: Standard errors for kernel matching algorithms (normal/Gaussian and Epanechnikov) 
are based on 200 bootstrap replications. Standard errors for nearest-neighbour algorithms are 
based on the method proposed by Abadie and al. (2004).  
OS (off support) indicates the number of treated individuals discarded because of missing 
 
 
Table 5. Propensity score matching – effect of French PE and foreign PE on training 
 
 Effect of French PE Effect of foreign PE 
 Effect SE OS Effect SE OS 
Decrease of training expenses       
   Nearest-neighbour matching -0.038 0.043 1 0.081* 0.061 0 
   Kernel matching (normal/Gaussian) -0.035 0.029 1 0.115** 0.047 0 
   Kernel matching (Epanechnikov) -0.038 0.034 1 0.109** 0.049 0 
* if p < 0.10; ** if p < 0.05; *** if p < 0.01 
Notes: Standard errors for kernel matching algorithms (normal/Gaussian and Epanechnikov) 
are based on 200 bootstrap replications. Standard errors for nearest-neighbour algorithms are 
based on the method proposed by Abadie and al. (2004).  
OS (off support) indicates the number of treated individuals discarded because of missing 
 
 
Table 6. Private Equity and Work and Employment Relations, 
Probit regression, reporting marginal effects 
 
 Model 1 
Presence of 
temporary 
workers 
Model 2 
Restriction, 
freezing or 
decrease of 
compensation 
Model 3 
Decrease of 
training 
expenses 
PE funding    
   None Ref. Ref. Ref. 
   French PE -.002 
(.061) 
-.018 
(.060) 
-.020 
(.026) 
   Foreign PE .150** 
(.065) 
.187*** 
(.058) 
.093*** 
(.043) 
Industry    
   Industrial sector Ref. Ref. Ref. 
   Wholesale and retail trade -.405*** 
(.057) 
-.136** 
(.065) 
-.026 
(.031) 
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   Services -.460*** 
(.046) 
-.092 
(.068) 
-.0102 
(.032) 
   Others -.120* 
(.067) 
-.029 
(.064) 
.011 
(.033) 
Parent firm size    
   50 - 99 employees Ref. Ref. Ref. 
   100 - 199 employees .016 
(.056) 
-.016 
(.054) 
-.008 
(.027) 
   200 - 499 employees .064 
(.059) 
-.027 
(.056) 
.008 
(.031) 
   500 - 999 employees .200*** 
(.063)** 
-.047 
(.063) 
-.008 
(.032) 
   1000 - 4999 employees .152 
(.067) 
-.048 
(.065) 
.052 
(.043) 
   5000 and more .012 
(.078) 
-.149** 
(.070) 
 
.019 
(.043) 
Age of the establishment    
   Less than 10 years Ref. Ref. Ref. 
   10 to 19 years .075 
(.068) 
.013 
(.064) 
.050 
(.046) 
   20 to 49 -.057 
(.063) 
.012 
(.059) 
.000 
(.034) 
   50 and more .017 
(.068) 
.126** 
(.062) 
.057 
(.044) 
Mono-unit .056 
(.041) 
-.086** 
(.039) 
. 001 
(.027) 
Skills ratio .043 
(.072) 
.184*** 
(.061) 
.036 
(.040) 
Union representative .197*** 
(.037) 
.121*** 
(.037) 
.010 
(.019) 
Observations 944 944 944 
Log likelihood -547.645 -620.663 -247.968 
Pseudo R² 0.158 0.050 0.057 
Prob>chi2 0.000 0.000 0.017 
*significance at the 10% level; **significance at the 5% level; ***significance at the 1% level 
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1
 The French PE market is the second largest in Europe after the UK, with about €31.12 billion funds 
invested between 2009 and 2013 in 2939 companies (vs. €47.64 billion and 2351 companies for the 
UK) (EVCA – Essential Work 2014-2019; Private equity’s contribution to building European 
businesses). 
2 We then explored what would happen when we included younger firms and those less than five years 
old.  Suprisingly, the results were broadly similar, even though debt leverage would be much less 
significant in such instances (given less assets that could be used as collateral).  Although Venture 
Capital is often seen as having more benign effects on firms (Botozzi & Da Rin 2002), this did not 
appear to be the case.  This could reflect both the great variability of expertise in the Venture Capital 
industry, and an ultimate concern with value release within limited time horizons.   Full results of this 
additional analysis are available from the authors. 
3
 In a first step we used probit models to test the link between French PE and all our dependant 
variables (the same for foreign PE). As probit models don’t identify causal links, propensity score 
matching method was preferred (for a comparison between these two methods, see Bryson et al., 
2002). Results with probit models (in Appendix, Table 6) and results with propensity score matching 
are very consistent. 
4
 See Caliendo & Kopeinig (2008), Heckman et al. (1997), Imbens (2004), Smith & Todd (2005) for 
overviews of matching methods. 
